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20 November 1985

NOTE TO: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: EXDIR Paper "More on Leaks"

John -

1. I have no serious problems in principle with Jim's proposals, but I do have a few observations:

- As Jim points out, restricted dissemination of either DI or DO material will still put information in the hands of people who do the vast majority of the leaking. At the same time, it may take the material out of the hands of people at lower levels who genuinely need to have it or could use it.
- One point Jim overlooks is that there already is a significant differentiation made between the dissemination of more sensitive papers and routine papers. Intelligence assessments and other information that are either source or politically sensitive already are disseminated in extremely limited copies -- somewhere between two and four dozen depending on the subject. The only papers that are disseminated in large quantities any more are those that do not involve sensitive technical or human sources or are not particularly controversial. For example, we no longer

turning

talk about restricting dissemination of DI papers, for the most part that would include things that are not particularly sensitive nor susceptible to leaking. (S)

2. Jim cites in paragraph five several contributions his program would make to managing the leaks problem. I agree with three of those. Reducing dissemination would help regain the initiative; it would strengthen our ability to ask others to take difficult steps; and it would get the attention of a lot of people. I'm not sure I agree it would ultimately improve our

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ability to deliver our intelligence or have any impact to speak of on the number of leaks. (S)

3. I have no objection to reducing further the dissemination of DI products, but I do not think it makes sense to do that alone. I would oppose further reduction in the DI dissemination in the absence of very real changes in the dissemination of raw traffic from both the DO and NSA. I disagree with Jim that we cannot deal with NPIC and NSA at this point. Too many of the leaks that occur involve NSA material to rely only on exhortation. The Director has statutory responsibility and authority to deal with protection of sources and methods and I think you would find in Odom a willing partner in reducing dissemination. Similarly, it does not make any sense to reduce CIA's finished intelligence without a parallel reduction on the part of DIA. All of the information is the same. Accordingly, I have no objection to the kind of program Jim has laid out but I strongly believe that it should be a Community-wide program that does not focus just on CIA (or as so often has happened in the past, solely on the DI). (S)

4. Insofar as the suggestions in paragraph 8 are concerned, I have no objection to any of them. I disagree that briefing (paras 9-12) is a particular problem area. While you may not have the constant reminder of a security classification in front of you, neither do you have a piece of paper that you can xerox or share with people who are not authorized access. A briefing enables you to target an audience without a lot of people on the periphery that would have access to a written document. It also enables you to know specifically who is receiving the information so that when the time comes for an investigation you have a better place to start. In short, I think paragraphs 9-12 are flawed. Indeed, I believe we should do more briefing not less. (S)



Robert M. Gates

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